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In the Supreme Court 
of the State of Utah 
EBBA E. FIN LA YSOX and .ALLAK 
FINLAYSOX, 
Plaintiffs and Appellants. 
-vs.-
KENNETI-I BRADY and DONALD . 
.B. ~IILNE, partners doing .business 
as Brady-l\Iilne Appliance Com-
pany. 
Defendants and Respondents 
No. 7713 
BRIEF OF RESPONDENT 
KATURE OF THE CASE 
The respondents agree with the appellants' state-
ment of the Nature of the Case in most part -except, 
wherein appellants state that the respondents br-ought 
a separate suit upon the smne theory as appellants ( ap-
pellants' brief page 4) and contend that the basis of 
the second suit is as pointed out in respondents Answer 
-and Counterclaim ( R. 12). 
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STATEMENT OF· FACTS. 
The statement of facts as made by the appellants 
is certainly stated most favorable to the appellants and 
in most particulars is argumentative, misconceives the 
pleadings, is based upon suppositions, assumptions, and 
is sought to draw unfair inferences. The evidence ad-
duced at the trial certainly does not support the facts as 
stated by the appellants, therefore, it becomes inherent 
that the respondents restate them in or:der that they may 
be correctly viewed. 
Since the p~ints argued by the appellant primarily 
deal with the sufficiency of the evidence, and since an-
swering them requires a complete review of the evidence, 
the respondents only wish to make a brief statement of 
the facts· at this time. 
In the summer of 1948 the appellants were construct-
ing an apartment building consisting of three four-room 
apartments and one three-room apartment situated at 
466 Lindell Lane, Sandy, Utah (R. 115, 239). Each 
apartment was to be and is heated with a separate gas 
space heater (R. 116, 238, Exhibit B). Apartment No. 
1 was located on the ground floor, west side of the build-
ing, apartment No. 2 on the ground floor east, apart-
ment No. 3 in the basement under No. 2, and apartment 
No. 4 was likewise in the basement under No. 1 (R. 144, 
145). All chimneys, flues, pipes, lead-ins, etc., was con-
structed solely by the appellants and not the respondents. 
Two separate· flue chimneys were constructed by Mr. 
Finlayson in the building, one on the east side to provide 
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vents for aparhnent~ No. :2 and :; and the other on the 
"~est side to vent the heating units in apartments No. 
1 and 4 (R. 121, 1:2:2, 1:2~~, 144, 145) both of which are in-
adequate ( R. :2R~~). 
The appellants In their brief, page No. 4, contend 
that ~Ir. Finlayson had known the respondents for 1nany 
years and infer that due to this relationship unfair ad-
vantage had been taken of them. Such is not the case, as 
both of the respondents deny knowing :Mr. Finlayson 
personally until the tinte of son1e business transactions 
~;everal n10nths prior to the case at bar (Exhibits 1, 6, 
7). 
In August 1948 :Mr. Finlayson contacted ~Ir. l\filne 
regarding the purchase of the n1erchandise in question 
(R. 238, 306). ~lr. Finlayson represented to l\Ir. :~1ilne, 
at this time, that he was securing bids for said Inerchan-
dise and that he had already requested pennission to go 
ahead for the gas (H. 154, 239) when actually he did not 
even make application for the gas until December 27, 
1948, as is shown by a ~fountain Fuel Supply Co. Official 
(R. 219, 220). 
After inspeding the 1nerchandise, at the respond-
ents' ~Iurray :--;tore, the appellants purchased the lner-
chandise shown in Exhibit B. ~rhe 1nerchandise pur-
chased consisted of 4 Servel Gas Refrigerators, 4 Har-
wick Gas Ranges, 1 Servel \Vater Heater, 3-50,000 BTU 
and 1-30,000 BTl' Brilliant Fire Gas Space lieaters with 
a total lJUrchase price of $1,675.00 (Exhibits B, 6, 7). 
All of the space heaters were at the time and still arc 
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American Gas Association approved and listed, the 
standards set up for such approval being set by the 
American Standards Association (R. 218). The heaters 
in question were manufactured by the Ohio Manufactur-
ing Company (R. 219, 263) which company has been in 
business some 105 years (R. 263). The appellants have 
made an issue of the fact that they did not get Crosley 
Space Heaters (R. 119, 129, 136, 141), yet the respond-
ents have never carried such a brand heater (R. 250, 
251, 284, 314) and in fact no such type heater even exists 
as is evidenced by two gas company officials and ac-
cording to the American Gas Association Directory (R. 
202, 218). 
Mr. Finlayson indicated to Mr. Milne, at the time of 
purchase, that he desired to pay cash but wanted a 
couple of months to pay it in (R. 242, 243). Relying upon 
this and the fact that the respondents had had satisfac-
tory business relations with the appellants several 
months previous to this (Exhibits 1, 6 & 7, R. 238) the 
respondents ordered some of the goods not on hand (R. 
241) and set aside within a few weeks time as Mr. Fin-
layson's property the above items (Exhibit 6 & 7, R. 239, 
246, 24 7, 285). During the course of business the re-
spondents often sell merchandise the terms of payment 
for which is considered to be cash if paid within 60 or 
90 days. However, in order to protect themselves they 
require the customer to sign a conditional sale contract 
("Protective Contract") and do not date it at that time. 
Then if after the alloted time the customer can not meet 
the requirements for cash he is given credit for the pay-
6 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
ments 1nade to date mul a new contract is executed. 
Sueh i:"' the eaH' here (ll. :24:2-:2-t:q. On .August 14, 1948, 
(H. :2~~S) whieh is contrary to appellants' contention of 
December 6, 19-l:S (appellants' brief page 5, U. 118, 120, 
143, 153) $50.00 wa:"' paid a:"' a partial down pay1nent 
(Exhibit:; 1 & 7) which i~ also contrary to ~[r. Finlay-
~on ":::; testiu10ny that he ncn:r made any such paynwnt 
(H. 146) and the .. protective contract'' (Exhibit A) was 
executed. rrhe respondenb after being told at the tinle 
of the sale on .August 1-t. 1!l48 (R. 2:18) that the appel-
lants had applied for the gas (U. 239) when such was not 
the case (R. :21!1, ~:20), and having been disappointed on 
the pronrise of the appellant~ to pay ca~h within 90 days 
(R. 242, 243, 2-!4, 248, 249 286, 307) as well as having 
the nterchandise tied up in their warehouse eannarked 
for the re~pondents (R. 283, Exhibit 6), beca1ne appre-
hensive of the good faith of the appellants. Neverthe-
less, they leaned over backwards to try and expedite 
the installation of the gas (R. 239, 240), continued to 
listen to the tales of woe of the appellants (R. 242, 243, 
248, :249, 286, 307) in respect to the pay1nents to be made, 
and very foolishly installed the 1nerchandise on Decem-
ber 31, 1948 ( n. 127' 2;)3) in order to try and get the 
payn1ents as pr01nised. 
K o further payments were n1ade on this agree1nent 
until January 17, 1949 (Exhibits 1 & 7) s01ne 156 days 
after the fir~t payment and then only $150.00 (Exhibits 
C, 1 & 7) was paid 'vhich would still make the down 
payment short $140.00 of the $:340.00 required as evi-
denced by Exhibit A and B in case the cash tenus could 
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not be met. The cash terms were definitely not met and 
it took the respondents an additional 45 days more to 
get the appellants to sign the contract in question (Ex-
hibit B) which would be a mere 66 days past the 90 days 
originally granted. Exhibit B was signed on March 3, 
1949 in the appellants' home (R. 306) and superseded 
Exhibit A (R. 244) and was not signed three weeks after 
Exhibit A, or December 27, 1948, as contended by the 
appellants (appellants' brief page 5 and R. 120). At 
the time of signing Exhibit B the appellants paid the 
respondents $140.00 (Exhibits D, 1 & 7, R. 249, 307) 
which amount completed the $340.00 down payment, 
which is contrary to the appellants contention (appel-
lants' brief page 5). 
S.ometime between the date of installation of the 
equipment (R. 238) and the making of the second con-
tract (Exhibit B) the appellants painted their apart-
ments Nos. 1 and 2 and spilled paint on both refriger-
ators (R. 242, 314) and as a result of such the respond-
ents were forced to replace, at their own expense, said 
refrigerators or else not get paid for any of the mer-
chandise (R. 241) and have not been able to sell one of 
them to date. Therefore, they are out the price of this 
refrigerator-$185.75 (Exhibits 6 & 7). 
Two weeks after the valid contract (Exhibit B) was 
signed the respondents sold the contract to the Sandy 
City Bank with full recourse, March 16, 1949 to be exact 
(Exhibit 5) and the money receipted for on March 17, 
1949 (Exhibits 1 & 7). Additional payments amounting 
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to $9~:L50 haYt' been nuule on the eontract (.Exhibit 5, 
H. ~:2-:2:). 1:2;)) leaying a habnH'P on the contrad of $491.-
"ir> (Exl1ibits 5 & 7, R.. :2:2-:25, 330) which is contrary to 
appellants' contention in appellants' brief page 6 where-
in they clailn that only $:20:2.13 i~ due and in appellants' 
statement (H. 14:3) where he clain1~ that only $201.00 is 
~till due and owing. As a result of the appellants' habi-
tual delinquency in the pay1nents of the Inonthly install-
ment~ to Sandy City Bank the respondents were forced 
on X ovember 7, 1950 to repurchase the contract (Ex-
hibits 5 & 7, R. 22-25). 
The appellants contend that they refused to make 
any further paynwnts due to defective heaters (appel-
lants' brief page 7) but a careful analysis of Exhibit 
3 shows that not one but ev~ry payment, fron1 the tune 
of the due date of the first installn1ent until the present 
time, is delinquent and that at least 6 payments were 
not paid on tiu1e prior to the tirne the appe~lants men-
tioned that the heaters were turned on in Septetnber 
1949 (appellants' brief page 6, R. 128). 
The respondents, as they norrnally do, agreed to 
make only a nonnal hook-up installation of the equip-
ment (TI. 10, 240, 2GO)-i.e.-hook-up the appliances to 
whateYer facilities that the purchaser has arranged and 
this they did. rJ,he respondent:-; also agreed to guarantee, 
either expressly or irnpliedly, the heaters for one heating 
season only ( R. :25:2, 260, 311, 316). At the time the 
piece~ of equipment were installed the respondents in-
formed the appellant~ that the provisions made h:· the 
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appellants were not adequate and that they would not 
pass inspection by the Gas Company but the appellants 
insisted that the connections be made to the existing 
facilities (R. 268, 272, 289, 290, 292) and the gas was 
inspected and turned on by the Gas Company officials 
(R. 211, 221, 289). As a result of the connections of the 
heaters to the Finlayson provided flues (R. 268) and in 
the position desired by the appellants it necessitated the 
respondents to install 3 additional L's on each heater 
(R. 272, 274) which in turn cut down the efficiency (R. 
272, 275). The main chimneys as installed by Mr. Finlay-
son were not adequate to properly care for the BTU out-
put of the equipment installed (R. 279, 380). The stoves 
and refrigerators are not vented at all, yet they put out 
approximately one-half the output of gases that each 
heater does (R. 279-280). 
The appellants contend that the heaters leaked gas 
and were defective (appellants' brief pages 6-7). The 
respondents however, submit that the true facts are that 
such heaters were not defective, but if there was any gas 
leakage it was due to the faulty flues and the way the 
appellants insisted that the heaters be installed (R. 272, 
278, 279, 280, 283, 284, 285, 311, 313) as well as to the 
other eight pieces of gas equipment casting fumes into 
the rooms because they were not vented at all (R. 278, 
279, 280, 283). The appellants also contend (appellants' 
brief page 6) that the appellants lost $525.00 in rental 
due to the heaters. No evidence of any nature was ad-
duced at the trial to show that the apartments were va-
cant due to the heaters, and quite to the contrary three 
10 
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\\·itne::;se~ for the respondent~. all of wh01n lived in the 
apartment~ during the period in question, stated that 
the heaters functioned properly and they moved because 
of the inconvenience of the location of the aparbnents, 
tlw sil'A', and becan:-;l• the rental~ were too high (H. 139, 
~9-!, :297, ~99). ...:-\. careful analysi~ of Exhibit 2, which 
i~ the ofiicial turn on and off, a~ well as 1ueter readings 
of the t;·n~ cmnpany, will reveal that even if the apart-
ment::_.; were e1npty due to the heaters (which they were 
not) under no tircumstan(·e~ could there have been a loss 
of $5~5.00 as tharged but only $425.66, or approxilnately 
$100.00 le~~ than that prayed for. (This will be treated 
more fully in respondents' argu1nent ~ o. 1). 
At no tin1e frou1 the time of installation on Decen1ber 
~1, 1948 ( R. 1:2 7, 23:3) until K oven1ber 1949 ( R. 250, 253, 
:235, :23~, :276, 30:2, 309, 311) did the appellants complain 
in respect to the heaters. In K ovmnber 1949 the appel-
lanb dreamed up a new excuse for non-payrnent and 
notified the Sandy City Bank that the heaters leaked gas 
and they refused to umke any further payrnents until 
the heaters were fixed. The bank in turn notified the 
respondents (Exhibit E, H. 309) and the respondents 
confident that the leakage, if any, was not due to the 
heaters but to the flues and inadequate venting (R. 278, 
279, 280, :2S3, 30~, 304), but being desirous of cooperating 
to the "K" degree foolishly extended the olive branch 
once more and agreed to take the heaters out and weld 
the collars on them, (H. 230, 2G:3, 2;>;,, 258, 276, 297, 309, 
:nl), although in all their ~ix years experience (lt 277) 
and the instal1ation of ~mne G-1 sintilar heaters (R. 283) 
11 
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they had never had to do such. These heaters were only 
out about four hours (R. 220, 221, 277, 297, 310) which is 
contrary to the two or three weeks claimed by the ap-
pellants. No further complaints were made to the re-
spondents, or the gas company, relative to the heaters, 
except, one in May 9, 1950 to light a pilot light, until ap-
proximately one year later-October 1950 (R. 191, 197, 
250, 255, 258, 276, 309, 311) and at which time Mr. Brady 
again informed the appellants that the fault was not 
with the heaters but with the venting and flue installa-
tion by Mr. Finlayson. At the time of this complaint, 
which was only the second complaint from the time of 
installation, Mr. Brady stated that the heaters were out 
of warranty, as the guarantee only lasted one season 
(R. 252, 260, 311, 316), but if Mr. Finlayson would give 
Brady-Milne permission to raise the flues and would pay 
for it he thought such procedure would rectify the situ-
ation. Mr. Brady at this time, much to his surprise, 
learned that the appellants had sold the equipment and 
apartment house to Mr. and Mrs. Edwin Anderson on 
December 21, 1949 (R. 302, 303) which was in direct vio-
lation of paragraph 3 of the terms of the contract (Ex-
hibit B). Mr. Brady immediately called Mrs. Anderson 
(R. 303, 304) and she requested him to raise the flues. 
The respondent went further however, and discussed 
the matter with the gas company and took the heaters 
out and up to the Gas Company's warehouse and had 
some scientific tests run on them. They were there but 
one afternoon ( R. 213, 220, 221, 313) and were pro-
nounced all right when returned. A close analysis of 
12 
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l~xhibit. #3 will show that the fir~t and only maintenance 
call made by the ~a~ <·mnpany bet ween Derember :~I, 
1948 and Septmnber 1930, other than in October 1949 at 
the respondents' request, \Yas not until :\fay 9, 1950 and 
then it wa~ only to light a pilot light on the heater in 
Apt. #2-~lr. K.enneth D. 1-Iakanson. Therefore, the 
flr~t heat_ing season went along without event other 
than the four hours in October 1949 and the one service 
call to light the pilot light. The appellants' only witness 
during the first heating season (:\In~. Strebel, R. 186) 
even testified that no trouble existed during the first 
heating season, likewise, the new unauthorized owner 
testified to such (R. 302). 
At no tilne since purchase until the present date 
has the appellanb offered to return the heaters or asked 
to have them replaced (H. 254). 
At the conclusion of the trial the court directed a 
verdict in favor of the defendants-respondents and 
against the plaintiffs-appellants and further directed 
that judgntent he entered in the sunt of $491.73 (the bal-
ance due on the contract-Exhibit B) in favor of the 
defendants-respondent~, and for interest, costs, and at-
torney's fees. 
POINT ONE 
There i;-; sufficient eYideuee to sustain the Court's 
findings and in the direction of a verdict in favor of 
13 
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the defendants-respondents and against the plaintiffs-
appellants (Reply to appellants' Point One). 
POINT TWO 
There is sufficient evidence to sustain the court's 
judgment and award of attorney's fees as the appellants 
had continuously breached the contract from the very 
beginning and in many respects (Reply to appellants' 
Point Two). 
POINT THREE 
The court below properly denied plaintiffs-appel-
lants motion for a new trial (Reply to appellants' Point 
Three). 
POINT FOUR 
The appellants have compelled the respondents to 
defend this appeal, therefore, the court should award 
the respondents a reasonable attorney's fee and costs 
in compliance with Exhibit B, or else remand this case 
to the trial court for the trial court to award such. 
ARGUMENT 
POINT I 
Passing now to the main issues involved which are 
breach of contract, loss of rental, and breach of warranty 
14 
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( appellanh: • brief pag-e ~)). rrhe l'P:-:pondents re:-:pectfully 
1n·psent the following t·,·idt•HvP, dirPd testilnony, and 
~tnkments to show that then_\ wa:-: no breach of contract 
on their part, but the breaches, and we :-:ay breaehes, 
were on the part of the appellants: that there wa:-: no loss 
of rentals as a result of the heaters and even if there 
"·a~ a lo~s, reganlle:::.;s of the reason, it could not be 
nearly the mnount a:-: claiu1ed by the appellants; that 
there wa:::.; no breach of warranty on the part of the re-
~pondents, and even if there was such a breach, the ap-
pellanb had estopped thmnselves frma setting up this 
defense . 
..:\ good beginning point i:::.; the understanding in the 
minds of the respondents at the ti1ne the contract (Ex-
hibit A & B) waf' made which is expressed best by the 
direct testimony of :Jir. )Iilne: 
:JIR. S~\GERS: 
"Q. ~\t the time of the purchase or conversation 
relative to the purchase of this Inerchandise, 
what was said relative to the 1nethod of pay-
Inent? 
..:\. :Jir. Finlay:-:on wanted to pay cash if possible, 
hut he wanted, oh, I think in the conversation 
maybe ninety days to pay that cash; and 
I took it for granted that the line would be 
installed very quickly, and we could install 
our nwn·handi~e. Of course, I agreed that 
we could probably have it installed hy that 
time satisfactorily, and he could pay the 
eash. (R. ~-l-:2, :z-1-:~, 244). 
,.. * * 
15 
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Q. Now, what is the reason for no date on that 
contract (Exhibit A)~ 
A. Oftimes in our business dealings a person 
who wants to pay cash, if we agree orally 
that we will give them sixty or ninety days, 
we still have to have other protection, and so 
we ask our customer to sign the contract 
so that if we don't get the cash in the speci-
fied time, then the contract will protect us 
in the sale of the property, and I think that's 
what happened here. 
* * * 
Q. Well, in this particular case or a case similar 
to this, if the money was not paid within the 
sixty or ninety days agreed upon, then with 
the consent of the purchaser you would place 
the date in~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And then you would sell the contract in order 
to get your money~ 
A. Well, during this time he may have made half 
the total payment, and so at that time a new 
contract would be made up and sent in. 
That often times happens. If a customer 
thinks he can get it in ninety days and he 
can't, he is still given credit for the amount 
he has paid and the new contract made out. 
That's our procedure." (R. 243, 244). 
Contrary to the appellants' contention (appellants' 
brief page 5, R. 118, 120, 145, 153) that the "protective 
contract" (Exhibit A) was signed on December 6, 1948 
and that the valid contract (Exhibit B) was signed three 
weeks later-December 27, 1948, (R. 120) the respond-
16 
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ent~ submit that the .. protective eontraet'' was ~igneu 
on August 1+. 19-!S (H. ~:is, :2-1::1. imG) and the valid con-
tract wn~ signed in the appellants' home on l\lnrch 3, 
1949 (R. 30G) sorne :201 Jays after the initial down pay-
ment of $50.00 and at no time was any contract of any 
nature signed in Decentber 1948. At the tin1e of the con-
~ummation of Exhibit B thl' tentative contract (Exhibit 
A) became null and void (R. :244). The appellants con-
tend that they have 1nade payn1ents of $290.00 for which 
they have not been given eredit (R. 151 and appellants' 
brief page 5) and ~tate that they made a lun1p su1n cash 
payment of $340.00 (R. 121, 147). ~rr. Finlayson testi-
fied that he did not know anything about the $50.00 cash 
down payment on August 14, 19-18 (R. 146). It is hardly 
feasible that the respondents would give the appellants 
c.redit for this amount without receiving it from them. 
A ~em·ch of appellants' co1nplaint (R. 1-6) and counter-
claim (H. 76-80) show that no recovery is sought for this 
so-called additional $290.00 (Exhibits C & D). Exhibits 
1 & 7, which are the respondents official records, show 
that appellants were given proper credit for these two 
amounts. It will be noted that the appellants stipulated 
to and agreed at the time of the pretrial (R. 22-25) that 
the balance due was $491.73 and that only $983.50 over 
and above the $:340.00 down payrnent had been made. 
This appellants eonfinned in direct testi1nony (R. 125). 
'ro further refute that $340.00 was not paid in one sum 
(H. 259) we in,·ite the court's attention to the respond-
ent:-;' testimony (H. :231, :254, 315) wherein they show tlwt 
a contract is never u::;eu a:-:; a receipt. It is ridiculou::; 
17 
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to assume that a person is going to sign a second contract 
without getting full credit and then wait two years to 
raise such a point as was done here. However, to dis-
pell any misapprehension that may have arisen the re-
spondents respectfully submit the true facts adduced 
at the trial : 
At the time the "protective contract" (Exhibit A) 
was signed the respondents received $50.00 in cash (Ex-
hibits 1 & 7) and were to receive the full balance of the 
contract within 90 days (R. 242, 243). The respondents 
not normally stocking gas refrigerators as required by 
the appellants purchased them especially for the ap-
pellants (R. 241). All the merchandise was set aside 
in the respondents' warehouse for the use and benefit 
of the appellants and were to be delivered when re-
quested (R. 239, 246, 247, 285 and Exhibit 6). The 
respondents and their agents leaned backwards to try to 
cooperate with the appellants and even took the appel-
lants to the Gas Company to see if they could expedite 
the installation of the gas line (R. 239, 240) even though 
the appellants had misrepresented the facts at the time 
they ordered the equipment by stating that they had 
already applied for the gas (R. 154, 239) when actually 
they never applied until December 1948 (R. 219, 220). 
All during the period from August 14, 1948, at the time 
the protective contract was signed, until March 3, 1949, 
the respondents tried in vain to obtain the purchase price 
in cash from the appellants as they had agreed to pay 
(R. 242, 243, 244, 248, 286, 307) but were unsuccessful 
18 
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in their efforts. r_rhere WH~ a period of SOille fi n• lllOnths 
in which the respondenb had only n·<·Pi n•d $50.00 on the 
full purchase price (H. ~48, 249, 307 and Exl1ibits 1 & 7) 
and even installed the merchandise on December 31, 
19-!S (R. 1:21, ~33) with only this $50.00 payn1ent having 
been made. ..After further efforts of trying to get the 
ea~h the appellants finally paid $150.00 on January 17, 
1949 (Exhibits C, 1 & 7, R. 248, 249, 307) and $140.00 
on .llarch :~. 1949 (Exhibits D, 1 & 7, H. 248, 249, 307). 
These two mnounts plus the $50.00 paid on August 14, 
19-!S completed the total down payntent of $340.00 (Ex-
hibit~ B, 1 & I) which was so indicated on Exhibit B 
signed ~Iarch :1, 1949 in the appellants' ho1ne. r_ro fur-
ther refute appellants' contention a close analysis of 
. 
appellanb · Exhibit ~"- "·ill show that $340.00 wa~ not paid 
in cash at that tin1e because if you take the total cash 
price of $1675.00 and add the tinw differential of $159.68 
to it the total bec01nes $1,834.68 which is shown as the 
total tin1e price, also, this contract is not con1plete a~ to 
date, due dates, amounts of 1nonthly pay1nents, etc., 
whereas Exhibit B the true contract is complete in all 
respect. Further evidence that Exhibit A is merely 
a "protecti'{.?e eontnwf' and a contract is never con-
sidered a receipt is indicated by the record (R. 243, 244, 
~:>1, 2G+, 314). 
The trial court only permitted the introduction of 
Exhibit A for the purpose of deciding "·hether the court 
would permit the appellants to amend the pretr]nl ordee 
(ll. 1:2/). 1,he court stated as follow~: 
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THE COURT: 
Well I am going to let it in at this time 
because_ I have got to determine whether or not 
I shall permit an amendment later, and for that 
purpose it will be received. 
The trial court's answer to this is shown by the court's 
statement at the termination of the trial as follows: (R. 
327, 328). 
THE COURT: 
* * * The plaintiffs asked leave to amend this 
agreement and prove to you that $340.00 for 
which he had no receipt but which was recited 
in the contract was paid and then these $50.00, 
$150.00, and $140.00 items that make up the $340.-
00 were separate items that he wanted credit for, 
and that just doesn't ring true to me. A man 
that pays $140.00 on March 3 and then enters in-
to a con tract sometime between then and March 
7 and still takes the old $340.00 and doesn't claim 
anything in his contract when they enter $340.00, 
if he had paid $340.00 in cash before, he certainly 
would have said "Listen boy, let's up this price 
from $340.00 to include the additional $340.00 that 
I just got through paying you." He didn't do 
that, so I am not going to permit him to amend 
-that. I don't think there is anything to it, so you 
won't have to bother about that. 
To further substantiate the court's position and to 
show the absurbity of the contention we quote from 
the appellants' own testimony as follows: (R. 151, 152). 
MR. SAGERS: 
"Q. Just didn't understand it. Yet you gave 
$290.00 without making a complaint for it, 
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and you had your eancelled eheek~, one or 
then1 dated JanuarY whieh would have 
deared the bank and ~·on have another whieh 
you g-nn.~ jn~t a eou1;le of day~ before this 
i~ dated. How do yon explain it? .\ re you in 
the habit of g-oing and throwing away $290.-
00 without ~·L·tt ing credit for it? 
A. Oh, no. 
Therefore, we sub1nit that the only payments n1ade 
on either Exhibit A or B, and the record bears it out 
(Exhibit 1, H. :2-!S. :2-t-9, 307) was the $50.00 on August 
1-1, El-±~. the $150.00 on January 17, 19-!9 and $140.00 
on ~larch 3, 1949. 
rrhe appellant:-' lll their statelnent of facts (appel-
lants· brief page :l) and in their argu1uent one ( appel-
lants' brief page 9 and 11) contend that the respondents 
breached the eontract with the appellants by not in-
stalling heaters of a brand nmne of Crosley. At no tinw 
during the trial did the appellants produce any evidence 
other than ~Ir. Finlayson'::3 (R. 119, 129, 136, 141) that 
such a type heater exists. However, the respondents 
through their direct testi1nony (R. 250, 251, 284, 314) 
~how that they have never carried or even heard of such 
a heater. Further proof that no such heater exists is 
~hown through the tl'~timony of h\·o Gas Cmnpany offi-
rials and the .i\..merican Gas Association's directory ( 1:. 
:!02, 218). 
The appellants in their cmuplaint (R. 3) ~ed.: $32o.-
OO as the purehase price of the heaters whereas in av-
pellanc~· hrief pag-e 1L! the cost ha;.; gone up $10.00. The""'r 
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also seek $577.00 (R. 3) as the amount of rental loss. 
The appellant states in direct ex3:mination that the 
heaters cost $336.00-3 at $89.00 and one at $69.00 which 
would make a total of $336.00 (R. 142) and also stated 
that the rental loss was $530.00 (R. 132) and $525.00 (R. 
161 and appellants' brief page 6). It would appear from 
the record that the appellants are not at all certain what 
dates the tenants were there, when they moved, and how 
much rent was lost. No rent receipts were produced 
(R. 159) and the testimony by the appellants is certainly 
conflicting even as to the amount that was charged for 
rent. To further illustrate the confusion in the appel-
lants' mind as to the loss of rental we respectfully call 
your attention to the record at pages 130, 131, 132, 158, 
159, 160, 161 and 162). 
The contract covered some 13 items of equipment 
and inasmuch as the appellants are seeking recovery for 
amounts far in excess of the actual cost of the heaters 
the respondents respectfully invite the court's attention 
to respondents' Exhibit 6 & 7 which set out the actual 
cost of each piece of equipment, a summary of which is 
as follows: 
Date Ticket Unit Grand 
SOld Number Quan. Description Price Total Tax Total 
8-14-48 4827 1 Maytag Washer $131.85 $131.85 $ 2.64 $ 134.49 
50,000 Brilliant Fire 
8-16-48 4839 3 Space Heaters 54.20 162.60 3.25 165.85 
8-23-48 4875 4 Apt. Hs. Ranges 86.40 345.60 
45 Gal. Servel 
1 Water Heater 230.40 230.40 11.52 587.52 
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Servel Apt. 
9- 3-48 4944 4 House Refrig. 185.75 743.00 14.86 
30,000 Brilliant Fire 
1-7-49 5575 1* Space Heater 49.95 
Less 20'/c 10.00 39.95 .80 
Total 







Xow segregating the heaters from the others you have 
3 Heaters costing $ 165.85 
1 Heater costing 40.75 
Total cost of heaters $ 206.60 
I~.,rom the above analy~i~ it i~ very evident that the 
eo~t of the heater~ can not po:'~ibly be nwre than $206.60 
including sales tax which is approximately $120.00 less 
than that sought by appellant~. 'Ve think this speaks for 
itself, of coun;;e using these so-called "defective heaters" 
for several years nuiy have enhanced their value $120.00. 
Inasmuch a~ there is ~o 1nuch discrepancy relative 
to the appellanb' te~tin10ny as to ·when the aparhnents 
were vacant we deeu1 it only fitting and proper that the 
eomplete analy~i ~ of the dates the gas "\Vas connected in 
each apartment should be made at this ti1ne. It is not 
eoneeivable that a party living in an apartn1ent would 
lmve the ga~ turned on or off very utany day~ l)efore he 
* This heater was indavertently not written up at 'the time of the 
others but was set aside when the other heaters were. 
** This credit memo not run thru the records until May 1949 bwt as 
both Exhibit A and B will show was taken into consideration in 
the calculations. 
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or she moved in or out of an apartment, therefore, the 
most reliable record would be the "turn on" and "off" 
and "meter reading" sheets of the gas company which 
is evidenced by Exhibit #2 (R. 202, 203, 204, 205, 206, 
207). We wish to point out that the below listed analysis 
is a complete record up to the time of the trial which 
would include the period from June 1949 to April1951, 
a period which by all means is most favorable to the 
appellants because it includes a considerable length of 
time past the warranty period of one heating season, 
nevertheless, we submit it for your consideration: 
Apart. No. Date Date 
and Location Name of Tenant Conne'cted Discon. Meter No. 
Water Heater Allan L. Finlayson 6-23-49 1-26-50 443-7388 
Basement Edwin Anderson 1-26-50 Present 
Apt. No.1 D. A. Bruno 6-28-49 9-23-49 443-7295 
WestSide Up Clarence Peterson 11-25-49 1-28-50 
Keith :M. Rice 1-28-50 8-11-50 
George Haner 8-15-50 9- 5-50 
Walter Seggerman 9- 5-50 Present 
Apt. No.2 Douglas Steadman 6-23-49 10-12-49 419-560 
East Side Up Glenn E. Lloyd 11-15-49 1-18-50 
Kenneth D. Hakanson 1-21-50 8-11-50 
Benny Beckstead 8-21-50 Present 
Changed 
9- 7-50 Meters 444-1272 
Apt. No.3 A. M. Swenson 6-29-49 10- 4-49 443-7363 E'ast Side Down 
Peter G. Strebel 2- 7-50 Present 
Apt. No.4 Jack C. Beck 6-23-49 10-24-49 443-7417 
West Side Iris C. Lees 11- 7-49 12-11-50 
Down J. E. Green 1-23-51 Present 
From the above schedule it can be seen that apart-
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ment X o. 1 wa::' empty fi·om 10-1-49 through 11-24-49 and 
n~ing the rent of $73.00 per month ns stated hy ~~ r .. F.,in-
layson (H. 130) the loss of rental would be $135.00. 
apartment X o. ~ wonld haYe a loss of rental of 
$SO.S-! as it would be empty fr01n 10-13-49 through 11-
1±-49 and apartment X o. 3 being e1npty from 10-5-49 
through 1:2-31-49 would han_• a loss of rental at $65.00 
per month of $1SG.-t:J: and aparhnent X o. 4 with a rental 
of $55.00 and vaean('y period fr01n 10-25-49 through 11-
G-+9 would amount to $~:1.39 or a grand total of only 
$425.GG under the nwst favorable conditions to the ap-
pellants. Further analy:-;is of these fads show that each 
amount alleged as shmvn by )[r. Finlayson'~ testinwny 
(R. 130-1::1:2, 157-162 and appellants brief page G) is very 
different fr01n the above calculation. Taking the above 
figun•s, which are certainly the nwst favorable to tlw 
appellant~, the loss of rental could not possibly be nwre 
than the above figure which is approxiinately $100.00 
less than that clailned for by the appellants. 
The testimony of :\larie Haner who lived in apart-
ment Ko. 1 (upstairs west) and who only paid $60.00 
per month rental, ~ho1vs very plainly that she did not 
have trouble with the heaters and did not Inove on ac-
count of them ( R. 1:-3S, 1m>, 140) : 
~IR. HAGERS: 
''Q. And while you were there, did you ever s1ncll 
any gas'? 
~\. No, we didu't. 
Q. Did you n1ove on account of the gas'? 
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A. We moved because we had four children, and 
we found a house that was larger, and it 
made more room for· us with the house. It 
had nothing to do with the gas. 
Q. How much rent did you pay at this time 1 
A. Sixty Dollars. 
Q. Sixty dollars a month 1 
A. Yes." 
Mrs. Seggerman who is a present tenant in apart-
ment No. 1 stated that the heater exploded in apart-
ment No. 4 (R. 181, 182) which testimony was stricken 
as hearsay but to show to your honorable body that this 
is unfounded we set forth direct testimony from Mrs. 
Iris Lees who lived in apartment No. 4 (basement west) 
for two heating seasons (R. 293, 294, 295) : 
MR. SAGERS: 
"Q. Did you have occasion to live in the apart-
ment house of Mr. Finlayson 1 
A. I did. 
Q. In other words, that would be one complete 
heating season and part of another 1 
A. Yes. 
Q. Now while you were living there, did you 
smell any unusual odors, or did you have any 
occasion to be fearful-well, just one ques-
tion at a time. I'm sorry. Did you smell any 
odors1 
A. Just from the hallways. 
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Q. You had no trouble with your heater with 
respect to odors! 
A. No. 
Q. "J(rs. Lees, why did you move fr01n the 
aparbnent house' 
A. \Yell, one reason because it wasn't big 
enough for 1ny husband and three children, 
and then I was expecting. 
Q. You were not fearful of the heaters at all f 
A. No." 
i\IR. BAYLE : 
"Q. I see; and at any tin1e while you were there 
did the stove in your apartment blow up' 
A. It 1nade a noise, but what do you mean by 
blowing up1 
Q. \Vas there any kind of an unusual explosion' · 
A. Well, no. 
Q. Did you ever have any trouble with the heater 
at all1 
A. \Vhat do you mean, trouble. What kind of 
trouble? 
Q. Did you have any situation arise where it 
'vasn't functioning norn1ally? 
A. No. 
Q. Never had any difficulty? 
A. No. 
Q. Did you ever experience any physical effects 
from what you thought wa~ gas~ 
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A. No. 
Q. Never had any headaches~ 
A. No." 
The testimony of Mr. Glenn Earl Lloyd (R. 296, 
297, 298) who occupied apartment No. 2 (upstairs east) 
for two months during the heaviest of the winter shows 
that the heater worked fine: 
MR. SAGERS: 
"Q. While you were there, did you smell any 
odors~ 
A. Not that I know of. 
Q. Did you have the heaters on while you were 
there¥ 
A. Yes sir. 
Q. How did they work¥ 
A. Worked fine. 
Q. Did you ever have any trouble with them~ 
A. No sir. 
Q. Was the gas company ever there at anytime 
in regards to the heaters~ 
A. The man there in the back come and removed 
the heater in November for a period of four 
hours( pointed to Mr. Haws). 
Q. Four hours~ 
A. That was in my apartment. I don't know 
about the others. 
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Q. But it wasn't due to any function of the 
heater~ 
A. No. I didn't know what was the matter. 
Q. Why did you move from there~ 
A. It was too high rent and far out, and my wife 
was expecting, and she had a nerve in her 
back pinching, and she had to be closer to 
a doctor." 
The testimony of Mr. Clarence Petersen who lived 
in apartment No. 1 for several months during the heat-
ing season of 1949-50 is as follows (R. 298, 299): 
MR. SAGERS: 
"Q. While you were there, did you smell any 
odors~ 
A. No. 
Q. Did you ever have any trouble with the gas 
heater~ 
A. Well, we didn't use the gas up until-we were 
away. We were out working, and the kids 
were to school, and they were taken care 
of with the other people, and we were at 
work and then we would come at night. 
Q. But you were t~ere in the morning~ 
A. Yes. 
Q. And you were there at night~ 
A. Uh huh. 
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A. 'Ve did up to, oh, started in November, when 
it started to get cold. 
Q. And you used the heater frmn N oYember to 
the time that you n1oved is that correct? 
A. Yes. 
Q. Did you ever get any headaches? 
A. No sir. 
Q. Did you ever smell any odors? 
A. No. 
Q. Did the heater ever give you any trouble¥ 
A. No trouble at all." 
From the foregoing it is the contention of the re-
spondents that the appellants have failed to show that 
there has been a loss of rental as they have not pro-
duced one single witness or deduced any testimony that 
gives any indication that any of the tenants moved on 
account of heater trouble. 
It 'vould appear that this action was brought solely 
to get out of paying the balance of $491.75 due on the 
contract. The court quring the respondents' motion to 
dismiss stated as follows (R. 114, 115) : 
THE COURT: 
"Q. l\Ir. Bayle, have you paid this down to a sum 
less than the amount you are praying for 
here~ 
A. 'Ve have paid it down to about that sum, 
Your Honor, well, no, we got dan1ages in ad-
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dition for rentals, of course, loss of rentals; 
but as to the price of the heaters, we have 
down below what we claiin the price of the 
heaters cost." 
This is definitely refuted in the fact that in the 
appellants' complaint and brief they seek recovery of 
$336.00 (R. 3, appellants' brief page 14) for the heaters, 
yet, the analysis made of Exhibit 6 & 7, supra, shows 
the cost of the heaters to be only $206.60 including tax. 
Furthermore, appellants stipulated to such at the pre-
trial (R. 2:2-25) and again in direct testimony (R. 125, 
126) by stating that $983.50 had been paid since the 
contract was made which in turn would leave a balance of 
$491.75 which is considerably more than contended by 
the appellants under any circumstances. 
Turning our attention now to the question of war-
ranties in the law of sales as applied to the case at bar. 
The respondents contend that the appellants are in no 
position to complain as the respondents were not proper-
ly notified of such a breach of warranty, even if such 
were the case. We believe the instant case comes 
squarely within the provision of Section 81-3-9, Utah 
Code Annotated, 1943, which was called to the court's 
attention (R. 112) and which provides: 
"* * * But if, after acceptance of the goods, 
the buyer fails to give notice to the seller of the 
breach of any promise or warranty within a 
reasonable time after the buyer knows, or ought 
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In the instant case the appellants never complained 
to the respondents until N ovmnber 1949 (R. 309) and 
the respondents have only. been over to the appellants' 
apartments three times to service the heaters in all the 
ti1ne they have been installed as is evidenced by testi-
mony of the respondents and their agents (R. 250, 253, 
~55, 258, 276, 302, 309, 311), once in October 1949 and 
twice in November 1950 which is almost a year after 
the appellants had breached their contract by selling 
the heaters to the Andersons (R. 302, 303). Howe,·er, the 
respondents do not rely solely upon the above cited stat-
ute but in addition and in the 111ain contend that what 
little inconvenience, if any, was caused not due to the 
heaters at all, hut due to the improper venting and 
installation of the flues made by ~r r. Finlayson himself, 
which, of course, the respondents had no control over 
whatsoever. rrhis is borne out l>y the testimony of f.[r. 
Haws who installed the heaters for the respondents (R. 
270 to 293 incl). 
~tR. SAGER~: (more specifically beginning at 
page 272): 
''Q. How many elbows were there there? 
~\. 'l'here's one, two, three, and the one where it 
hits-goes up in the vertical could be classed 
as four ninety-degree turns. 
Q. Is the efficiency cut down hy the number of 
elbows: I mean for every elbow does that 
cut down the efficiency of your draft·~ 
~\. For c\·ery ninety-degree L, ·that's equal to 
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three feet of pipe, according to the gas coin-
pany code. That'::-; in flues or fuel lines. 
Q. Now, in reference to this particular installa-
tion, did you haYe any discussion with refer-
ence to this installation with 1\Ir. Finlayson 
at the time before they were installed 1 
A. Yes, when ~[r. Christopherson called me 
over to see if he should go ahead with it the 
way it was requested I told Mr. Finlayson 
I didn't think the gas company would ap-
prove it if it was put in that way, but it was 
insisted that it be put in that way and I put 
it ~ that way. 
Q. Now, did you notice anything else in the 
installation of the equipment which Mr. Fin-
layson had put in 1 
A. Yes, the fuel lines. Coming from the front 
of this house, there's four meters underneath 
the porch. Each apartment is on its own 
meter. Two of those fuel lines run through 
this partition here coming along. It would 
be on the floor of the upstairs apartments 
and on the ceiling of the downstairs apart-
ments, if you follow me, coming along these 
two lines, one for upstairs and one for down-
stairs. Those lines were in with thread con-
nections, and they were plastered in and con-
cealed, which according to my information 
is not according to gas company code to have 
a concealed fitting, a threaded fitting plas-
tered in. If they are going to be concealed, 
they must be welded. 
Q. I show you Mr. Haws, a book marked "Rules 
and Regulations for Gas Piping and Instal-
lation" put out by the Mountain Fuel Sup-
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ply Company. Are these the codes that you 
follow in installing? 
A. At that thne, ye~. I think since then they 
have revised some of their code and put out, 
but that was the hook in force at the time 
of installation. 
Q. At the time you went over there, you had 
a conversation-did you have a conversation 
with :\I r. Finlayson in reference to the in-
stallation? 
A. Yes. 
Q. "\Vhat was saidf 
..A. \Yell, we wanted to find out where these 
appliances went, for one thing. I wanted to 
bring this flue straight through the wall and 
put the heater on the flue. For instance, if 
we could have gone straight through like 
that, there would have been no cause for all 
these L's and turns, causing loss of gas fimv. 
Q. In other words, if ~'OU had gone straight 
through as you wanted to, would you have 
cut out any L's? 
A. About three. 
Q. And the more L's you haye does that cut 
down the efficiency ? 
A. Right. 
Q. If you had gone ~traight in, would the draft 
have been better? 
A. Couldn't have helped but been better. 
Q. And that's what you wanted to do? 
t\. ~rhat's right. rrherc is one other thing here. 
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This five-inch flue, according to the gas com-
pany code, does not carry the cross section 
area enough to carry two four-inch pipes 
going into it. '11he code reads, if I Inay state, 
the vertical shall be the full cross section 
area of the largest pipe entering it from the 
horizontal plane plus three-fourths the area 
of second pipe. Now, I don't know if the jury 
wants to figure out the cross sectional areas 
of these pipes* * * 
A. * * * but they are two inches shy in cross 
sectional area of being adequate. 
Q. :Mr. Haws, if you had installed these straight 
in, there would have been a better draft, 
and in your opinion do you think they would 
have worked properly¥ 
A. I think they would have worked properly 
because since that time we have had to 
modify the flue after all these other said 
changes that you have heard about; and 
looking at the same furnace from face view 
of it-I call it a furnace; it's a space heater 
-going off the back of this diverter, it comes 
across here with a slight upgrade and went 
in. Now, I have went over, and from this 
point here where it comes out the diverter 
up to here, there is a thirty-inch length of 
pipe, also eliminating this T here. I cut 
a hole through the wall and tin snipped into 
the inside pipe and made a tight joint there 
and have raised that flue in the two upstairs 
apartments. The two heaters in the basement 
are still identical on their installation. 
Q. But at the time you installed them you want-
ed to do that to begin with, is that correct, 
to run them straight in~ 
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A. I wanted to go straight 111 hy moving the 
heater over here. 'rhiR raise here helped 
on the draft after * * * 
Q. When "·as that done 1 
A. I think it was i\ ovember or December of 
last year. ~ehis is the last time I have been 
over there as far as doing anything with 
the heaters is concerned. 
Q. How many- times have you been over there 
with the heaters~ 
.-\. \Veil, Rince they were installed I think I 
have had occasion to be over there three 
ti1nes. 
Q. At the time ~~ou took them in there in October 
and N ovemher of 1949, I mean took them out 
for welding, at ·whose suggestion did you 
take them out ? 
A. It was somebody from the gas company, I 
wouldn't modify factory specifications on any 
piece of equipment without an okey from 
someone in authority. 
Q. How long did you have them out 1 
.-\. As I recall, I took two of them out. It took 
me four hours apiece on each heater to make 
the;.;e four welds on each heater. They were 
out and in the same day. It was two days 
involved." 
'I,his is borne out hy l\Ir. Brady's testimony (R. 
310) and ~[r. Lloyd's who was a tenant at the time 
(R. 297). 
''Q. r:l\vo out one day and two out the next day~ 
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·A. That's right. 
Q. And put thmn back in. What was the * * * 
you changed the factory specification' 
A. There was no specifications changed at that 
time * * * no, the gas cmnpany's contention 
was that this wasn't a welded connection 
there. That was a pressed steel connection. 
Q. Now, are all of the Brilliant Fire heaters 
just pressed steel~ 
A. All that I have seen. 
Q. Have you ever had occas1on to weld any 
others~ 
A. No. 
Q. Okey, go on. 
A. Now, that was where the weld was made, 
right there. So you see there was nothing 
changed on specifications outside of maybe 
improving the connection; so that there would 
be-there was absolutely no possibility of a 
gas leak at that point. 
Q. Now, in reference to these heaters, Mr. Haws, 
what is the most common cause of spillage or 
odor from a h~ater ~ 
A. Bad venting." 
Without quoting Mr. Haws any further it will be 
noted from his testimony that the other eight pieces 
of equipment installed were not vented (R. 278, 279, 
280). Furthermore, the ones that are vented-the heat-
ers-are done improperly and the appellants would not 
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If there was a breach of warranty as contended 
by the appellants it would appear that there would have 
1 
been n10re visits made to the apartlnents both by the 
respondents and the gas company. Other than the time 
the heaters were taken out in N" ovember 1949 and in 
October 1950 (R. ~GO, 253, 23:J, 258, 27G, 309, 311), the 
respondents did not make any visits to the apartments 
and both of these visits as shown above, were due to 
the faulty installation of the appellants and not the 
respondents. The gas company other than making a 
suggestion to weld the collars in October 1949 did not 
rnake a call in connection with the heaters until May 
D, 1950 which i~ two years after they were installed 
and at the close of the first heating season, then thi~ 
call was only to light the pilot light that had gone out 
in Aparhnent Ko. 2 (Exhibit 3). No further calls were 
rnade by anyone until September 1950. :Mr. 'franter 
in his testimony pointed out that the gas company makes 
a service order call slip out every time they are called 
(H. 208) and a close ana}~·sis of l~Jxhibit 3 revealf' that 
from the tirne the heaters and other equipment were 
installed on Deceruber 31, 1948 (R. 127, 253) until the 
time of the trial, April 11, 1951, which would certainly 
be stating things most favorable to the appellants as 
this would be way past the ·warranty period, there haxc 
been only 25 service calls for all four apartments and 
all 13 pieces of gas equipment. The record also shows 
that quite a fe\\· of these 25 calls were for lighting pilot 
lights and other pieces of equiprnent rather than the 
heaters. Further analyt'is will show that there has 
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been only an ayerage of 2--± calls concerning each heater 
in two and one-third yean-; so if there had been any-
thing drastically wrong there would have been nwre 
service calls. As specifically stated by the respondents 
the heaters are only guaranteed one heating season. 
Mr. Haws testimony shows that he has installed at 
least 6-± similar heaters and never had any trouble what-
soever (R. 283), the heaters are American Gas Asso-
ciation approved (R. :219), and are made by a company 
that has been in the stove business 105 years _(R. 263), 
one of the respondents has even installed similar type 
heaters in his mother's and brother's homes (R. 256), 
therefore we submit the heaters were not defective. 
We believe that the case at bar comes directly 
within section 81-5-7 (3), Utah Code Annotated, 1943, 
which is as follows : 
"Where the goods have been delivered to 
the buyer he cannot rescind the sale, if he knew 
of the breach of warranty when he accepted the 
goods, or if he fails to notify the seller within 
a reasonable time of the election to rescind, or 
if he fails to return or to offer to return the 
goods to the seller in substantially as good con-
dition as they were in at the time the property 
was transferred to the buyer* * *." 
Such is the case here as the evidence adduced and 
pointed out above directly show that the heaters are 
not defective, improper notice has been given, and at 
no time have the appellants offered to return said heat-
ers to the respondents, or have they sought to have 
them replaced, but have continued to use the heaters 
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all the time ( R. 25+). It is well settled law in Utah 
that a purchaser of pen;onal property waive~ or loses 
his right to rescind the contract for fraud, breach of 
warranty, or failure of the article purchased to conform 
to the contract, if he uses it in his business or otherwise 
as his own property, for his own benefit or convenience, 
and not 1nerely for testing or preserving it, after he has 
knowledge of the ground for recission. This doctrine 
it> followed in the following cases: 
Detroit Heating and Lighting Co. v~. Steven~, 
16 l~tah 177; 
Summers v:-;. Provo l~'~oundrY and jfachine 
Co., :lJ LT tah 320; · 
Advance Rumely Thresher Co. vs. Stohl, 8;} 
utah 1~-1-, which was confirmed by 173 Fed. 
834-The Y enezuela; 
Black on Rescission and Cancellation, 2nd 
Ed., Section 599. 
r:rhe above is supported by the evidence in that when 
the respondents brought their action to replevy the 
goods the appellants very quickly filed their bond to 
permit then1 to retain the goods. If they had been so 
bad and not fit for the purpose, etc. why didn't they 
pern1it the respondents to repossess as they had not 
paid down to within twice the value of the heaters f 
It is also well settled law that an action for dam-
ages for breach of warranty will not lie until the title 
to the property has passed and in this case title ha~ 
never IJal:il:led as by the tenw..: of the conditional :.:ale 
contract (Exhibit B) title wa::; to remain in the respond-
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ent until all payments are 1nade and there is still a 
balance due on the contract of $491.75 (R. 22-25, 125, 
216, Exhibits 5 and 7). The appellant breached the 
contract by selling it to the Andersons on December 21, 
1949 (R. 302) without authority and the new purchasers 
were even lead to belieye that the heaters were paid 
for (R. 302). 
Here the appellants could have continued their pay-
ments until title passed, and then brought their action 
to recover in damages the difference between the price 
agreed to be paid and the actual value, including com-
pensation for loss incurred in their so-called effort· in 
good faith to use the heaters in compliance with the 
warranty; or they could have promptly returned the 
property upon discovering the "so-called defect" and 
recovered the consideration paid, or tendered the return 
of the property on condition that the respondents return 
the payments received and the appellants have not done 
any of these, therefore, were not even entitled to be in 
court. This is evidenced by : 
130 A.L.R. 755 and annotations ; 
47 American Jurisprudence, Sec. 887, page 94. 
Where parties have produced all their evidence, 
and the court has received it, and they have rested their 
case at the trial, they have thereby admitted, and in that 
way estopped themselves from denying, that they can 
do no more to overcome the objection that the evidence 
is insufficient to sustain a verdict in their favor, because 
the question of the sufficiency of the evidence always 
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arises m cyery <'ase before its submission to a jury, 
and it is the provin<'e and duty of the court to determine 
it. 53 American Jurisprudence, Para. 340, Page 2/::l. 
\Vhere the evidence is conflicting and the court is 
asked to dh·ect a verdict, or on its mYn motion considers 
the direction of a verdict, all facts and inferences in 
conflict with the evidence against which the action i~ 
to be taken must be eliminated entirely from considera-
tion and totall~' disregarded, leaving for consideration 
that evidence only ·which j~; favorable to the party against 
whom the nwtion is leveled. 53 American Juris prudence, 
Para. 350, Page 282. 
rrhe presence or absence of conflicting testimony in 
a cause is a consideration by which the courts are gov-
erned in directing verdicts. ""\Vhere the material issues 
or controlling facts are conceded, or the proof offered 
to establish them is undisputed, uncontradicted, or un-
controverted, or such facts are conclusively established, 
or established beyond dispute, or the evidence is all one 
"'ay, and is unconflicting and uncontradictory, and only 
one legitimate inference may be drawn, and there are 
no circumstances which tend to impair or impeach it, 
and it is not susceptible of inherent weaknesses, im-
probabilities, and incongruities which in and of them-
selves naturally arise to contradict or impeach the 
"·eight and credibility of the utterances of the wit-
nesses, the only question being one of law, the court 
may, should, and must, direct a verdict. 53 American 
.T uris prudence, Para. 358, Pages 287 and 288. 
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As has been said, credibility, either one way or the 
other, should n1ake no difference in the operation of 
the fundan1ental principle which necessarily underlies 
the direction of verdicts in all cases. The question 
whether reasonable minds could arrive by reasoning 
processes at n1ore than one opinion or conclusion is 
always a question for the trial judge. 53 .American 
Jurisprudence, Para. 363, Page 291. 
The court's attention is respectfully invited to Fon-
ville vs. Wichita State Bank and Trust Co., 33 A.L.R. 
125, 161 Arkansas 93, 255 S.W. 561, wherein the court 
states: 
"The court should direct a verdict where 
there is no evidence sufficient to justify submis-
sion of the case to the jury." 
The court in Rosenfield vs. United States Trust 
Company, 122 A.L.R. 1210, 290 Mass. 210, 195 N.E. 
323 states: 
"A party is not entitled to the submission 
of the case to the jury where the evidence is 
insufficient to warrant a finding in his favor." 
The California court in California Packing Corp. 
vs. Lopez, 64 A.L.R. 1412, 207 Cal. 600, 279 P. 664, states : 
"The court has the right to direct a verdict 
only when, disregarding conflicting evidence, and 
giving opposing evidence all the value to which 
it is legally entitled, indulging in every legitimate 
inference which may be drawn therefrom, the 
result is a determination that there is no evi-
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dence of sufficient substantiality which would 
support a verdict contrary to the one direeted, if 
given." 
The above view 1s supported in Walters vs. Bank 
of America "A' at irJilal Trust and Savings Association in 
110 A.L.H. 1259, 9 Cal. 2d 46, 69 P. 2nd 839. 
Applying these principles to the instant case and 
viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the 
plaintiffs-appellant~, we respectfully submit that the 
trial court rightfully concluded that the plaintiffs-appel-
lants had failed in their burden of proof to show by a 
preponderance of the evidence that there existed any 
breach of warranty insofar as the heaters were con-
cerned and that they had also failed to show any loss 
of rental. r:rhis is easily substantiated by the view of 
the court in its remarks at the conclusion of the trial 
and at the time it directed a verdict in favor of the 
defendants wherein the court said: 
"\Yell, in view of the evidence there still 
i ~n't, I think, anything for the jury to fuss about. 
You have listened patiently and long, and these 
parties have a hurden to ~how by n preponder-
ance of the evidence their various propositions, 
and I have gone through them pretty thoroughly, 
and in 1nv n1ind burdens have not been established 
except '~'here they have been established and 
it's so well established that there is no need for 
argument about the thing." (R. 327) 
"Ninth, did the plaintiff lose rental hy reason 
of improper installation of the equipment de-
scribed in thi~ con1plaint or by rea::;on of a 
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defective condition of the· equipment~ Well, I 
don't think there is any evidence that you could 
say he did. He says he lost rental, but all the 
evidence is he came down here and his apart-
ments were vacant, and sometime later he rented 
them. Can you or I say those tenants moved 
out because of leaking gas~ He didn't bring any 
of the tenants here, and they were out when he 
got here, so there isn't any evidence you can find 
that, or there isn't anything for you to dispute 
about it. 
"If he did lose rentals, what was the amount~ 
Well, he hasn't proved there was any loss, so 
you can't tell that." (R. 329) 
In view of the foregoing comments it was over-
whelmingly apparent from the evidence adduced at the 
trial that the court was more than justified in directing 
a verdict in favor of the defendants and that there was 
nothing for the jury to act upon and the court would 
have erted in ruling otherwise than it did. 
POINT II 
· The appellants in their brief, page 15, state that 
they had exhausted all patience before they brought 
this suit. It would appear from the evidence adduced 
and the foregoing arguments presented by the respond-
ents in argument No. 1 that the facts show quite the 
contrary. The appellants have repeatedly breached the 
contract as they did not adhere to their promise to pay 
cash within 90 days; secondly, they would not sign the 
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valid conditional sale contract (Exhibit B) until March 
1949; thirdly, they have been delinquent in not one but 
every single payment that was due since the contract 
was signed. The appellants have stated in their brief, 
page 15, that Owen Despain, Assistant Cashier of Sandy 
City Bank asserted that the only period during which 
the plaintiffs were delinquent in their payments under 
the contract were when they had been granted a defer-
rnent. We invite the court to search :Mr. Despain's 
testimony as the respondents have found quite to the 
eontrary as follows (R. 234): 
~IR. ~AGERS: 
"Q. \Yell, you can delete that, yes, that's all 
right. Take from then on if they were defer-
red to July 17, then from July, was the July 
and August payments paid on time and so on 
down the line? 
A. As I would interpret this reoord, there were 
no payments that were paid. 
Q. No payrnents paid on time. IH that right! 
A. On exact date." 
r:rhe appellants complain that they had the payments 
deferred until July 17, 1949 (R. 226, 234) yet, on the 
other hand, state the heaters were not connected until 
Septernber 1949 (appellants brief, page 6, R. 128). In 
analyzing this we are at a loss to see how the appellants 
could expect to hlame the deferral of payments and non-
payment of payments to the "so-called defective heat-
en;" when the heaters were not even operating at that 
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time as shown by their own testilnony. The court's atten-
tion is respectfully invited to Exhibit 4 which are sam-
ples of the bank's delinquent notices (R. 229-230) and 
Exhibit 5 which is the bank's official payment record 
(R. 230). A close analysis of these two exhibits as well 
as of nlr. Despain's testilnony (R. 225-236) will speak 
for themselves. 
To further show that it was the appellants who 
breached the contract and not the respondents, we wish 
to point out that the equipment was sold to the Ander-
sons (appellant's brief, page 6, R. 164, 302) without 
authority or permission which is in direct violation of 
paragraph 3 of Exhibit B. 
· ·The appellants complain further in their brief, 
page 15, that the respondents brought a separate action 
in replevin. The court's attention is invited to the pre-
trial order (R. 22-25) wherein the court consolidated 
the two actions and denied the respondents the cost of 
filing their action. It will also be noted from the Mem-
orandum and Cost sheet (R. 50, 51) that this pretrial 
order was adhered to, therefore there is no reason for 
complaint. All the court awarded the respondents was 
the balance due, which they were rightfully entitled 
to under any circumstances, on the contract of $491.75, 
interest, and attorney's fees which were all provided 
for by the contract (Exhibit B). The respondents were 
denied damages for the refrigerator which amounted 
to the full amount of $185.75 as they have been unable 
to sell it since replacing it for the appellants. 
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The respondent~ invite the court to place them-
selves in the position of the respondents who had con-
tinually pern1itted the appellants to violate the contract 
without taking any legal steps as they didn't want to 
he involved in litigation ( R. 258) and have not so been 
involved in all six years of operation (R. 238), but 
when the appellants saw fit to involve the respondents 
in litigation, which is as shown hy the evidence merely 
a subterfuge to try and get out of paying the balance 
due on the contract, the respondents felt it high time 
to seek recovery by repossession proceedings. It is 
more than evident that it was the respondents who re-
peatedly extended the olive branch rather than the 
appellants. 
In the light of the evidence adduced, we respectfully 
conclude that the trial court was certainly not in error 
in entering judgment on the contract and in awarding 
attorney's fees to the defendants as provided for by 
Exhibit B. 
POINT III 
The appellants in their brief, page 16 and 17, com-
plain that the trial court erroneously entered findings 
of fad and conclusions of law and judgment and the 
court exceeded its authority by having the clerk of the 
court sign the verdict and judgment nunc pro tunc. 
The respondents admit that findings and conclusions 
and judgment by the court were entered in error but 
also submit that hy such entry they did not deprive 
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1e appellants of any rights and therefore such entry 
ras merely superfluous. However, on the other hand 
re invite the court's attention to Rule 60 (a) Utah 
tules of Civil Procedure, which permits the correction 
1f such mistakes and is as follows: 
" (a) Clerical mistakes in judgments, orders 
or other parts of the record and errors therein 
arising frorn oversight or omission may be cor-
rected by the court at any time of its own initia-
tive or on the motion of any party and after 
such notice, if any, as the court orders * * *." 
The respondents position being that the above entry 
.vas a mistake and a clerical error only and certainly 
lid not prejudice the appellants in any respect. Although 
.ve have no Code provision on this matter, our court 
rras recognized the inherent right of a court to enter a 
judgment nunc pro tunc to correct such errors. In this 
respect please be referred to the following: 
Frost vs. District Court, 96 Utah 106, 83 P. 
(2d) 737, on rehearing, 96 Utah 115, 85 
P. (2d) 601; 
126 A.L.R. (annotation on page 956) 949 ; 
In r~ Remick's Estate (California), 170 P. 
(2d) 96. 
The respondents contend that the signing of the 
verdict by the clerk and the signing of the jury fore-
man's name are mere ministerial acts and therefore 
certainly within the purview of the court's discretion-
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ary power to order thent to be done. The clerk acts 
as the court directs and therefore the clerk's duties 
in this respect are ministerial. Furthermore, the ren. 
dition of the verdict by the jury as directed by the court 
is a mere for1nality, the decision in effect being one 
of law hy the court. 53 American Jurisprudence, Para. 
353, Page 283. "\Y e are of the opinion that if the fore-
Inan of the jury refuses to sign his name to the Yerdict 
as directed by the court the court could place the jury 
foreman in contmupt for such refusal. Therefore, in 
the court ordering the clerk to enter the nunc pro tunc 
order it was 1nerely doing "now for then" what could 
have and should have been done at the close of.the trial, 
thus there was no abuse of the court's authority, the 
judgment was not altered, was valid, and the appellants 
not prejudiced. 
The appellants in citing Title 104-30-8, Utah Code 
Annotated, 1943 were in error as this section of the code 
was abrogated by Rule 58A of the U.R.C.P. which 
becmne effective January 1, 1950 and therefore is the 
only rule in force. However, as this new rule is similar 
in i1nport to the above statute and the court was 
within its proper bounds the appellants have no cam~e 
to cmnplain. 
Viewing the circumstances in the light most favor-
able to the plaintiffs-appellants and assuming Rule 
38..:\ (a) to he identical with 104-30-8, F.C.A. 1943, the 
court was stiH acting within its power to enter nunc 
pro tunc orders and the signing of the verdict and the 
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judgment on the verdict were mere formalities. The 
court in having the clerk sign the judgment the same 
day the nunc pro tunc order was n1ade would give it 
the same import as though it was signed on April 12, 
1951. · If anyone was prejudiced by this order it was 
the respondents as in the original verdict (R. 331) the 
respondents were given a lien on the property but 
the appellants were granted a stay of execution of 30 
days, but in the nunc pro tunc order the respondents 
were not given any lien. This procedure in effect stayed 
the proceedings, which in turn would not require the 
judgment to be entered within 24 hours as relied upon 
by the appellants. However, if the judgment should 
have been entered in 24 hours as contended by the 
appellants then they have no cause to complain as their 
motion for a new trial would not be timely made as 
it was not made until April 24, 1951 (R. 48) which 
would be past the deadline of 10 days as permitted 
by Rule 59 (b) U.R.C.P. The respondents do not rely 
on this contention but on the nunc pro tunc order, as the 
court was within its proper rights in entering such. 
The appellants contend in their brief, page 17, that 
a new trial should have been granted on the above point 
alone. The court's attention is respectfully invited to 
Rule 61 of U.R.C.P. which states: 
"No error in either the admission or the 
exclusion of evidence, and no error or defect in 
any ruling or order or in anything done or omit-
ted by the court or by any of the parties, is 
ground for granting a new trial or otherwise 
51 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
disturbing a judg1nent or order unless refusal 
to take such R.ction appears to the court incon-
sistent with substantial justice. The court at 
every stage of the proceedings n1ust disregard 
any error or defect in the proceeding which does 
not affect the substantial rights of the parties." 
By the enterinLr of the nunc pro tunc order neither 
party was hurt aH the same order was entered "now 
for then." 
~lotions for new trials being limited to statutory 
grounds only and the appellants failing to show any 
of the seven grounds for a new trial as granted by Rule 
59 of U.R.C.P. and the court certainly not exceeding 
its authority, very properly denied the motion of the 
appellants for a new trial. 
POINT IV 
r:rhe respondents being forced into litigation by the 
appellants, being c01npelled to bring a replevin action 
to recover their property because of the repeated viola-
tions of the terms of the contract by the appellants, 
and being put to great expense and trouble to defend 
this appeal respectfully request that your honorable 
body award the respondents a reasonable attorney's 
fee and costs or else remand this case to the trial court 
in order that it may award such, for the defense of 
this appeal. A reasonable attorney's fee being $500.00. 
52 
 
Sponsored by the S.J. Quinney Law Library. Funding for digitization provided by the Institute of Museum and Library Services 
Library Services and Technology Act, administered by the Utah State Library.  
  Machine-generated OCR, may contain errors.
CONCLUSION 
The evidence adduced even when construed most 
[avorable to the -appellants,- shows that the appellants 
failed in their burden to prove any loss of rental, that 
they failed to show the heaters were defective, that the 
respondents breached their contract, or that the appel-
lants sustained a breach of warranty. Quite to the 
~ontrary the evidence overwhelmingly supports the 
respondents' position that the appellants repeatedly 
breached the contract in many respects. Therefore, no 
other verdict than a directed verdict could be sustained 
and the lower court's decision should be affirmed by 
your honorable body. 
Respectfully submitted, 
VICTOR G. SAGERS, 
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